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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

••

Plaintiff-Respondent,

••

-v-

••

BRENT BINDRUP,

Case No • 18134

••

Defendant-Appellant.

••

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Brent Bindrup, appeals from a
conviction of second-degree murder in the Second Judicial
District in and for the County of Weber, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty of second-degree
murder in a non-jury trial held before the Honorable Calvin
Gould on September 21, 1981.

Appellant was sentenced to a

term of five years to life, which sentence was suspended and
the appellant was placed on probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks af firmance of the conviction
and judgment pronounced below.

In the alternative, respondent

seeks an order of this Court remanding the case to the Second

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Judicial District Court with directions to that court to enter
a judgment of conviction of manslaughter.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early morning hours of October 8, 1980, Ogden
City Police Officer Mike King, on regular patrol duty, "heard
a loud bang, a popping sound," and looked up in time to see a
pick-up truck sliding sideways followed by a motorcycle,
various parts of debris, and a body "flying through the air"
down Washington Boulevard (T.

9)o

He pulled his patrol car

into the intersection of Washington ari(f'"'3lst South and 5-10
seconds after the accident noticed.the light was still red in
the direction appellant was traveling

-(T.

9)o

Officer King

immediately radioed for assistance and checked the body he had
seen tumbling down the street
Feeney, was dead (T. 11).

(To

10). The victim, Mr. Charles

Officer King then assisted Mr.

Brent Bindrup, the appellant and driver of the pick-up truck,
and a passenger in the truck, Mr. Kerry Moyes, out of the
overturned trucko
injuries

(T.

11)

The appellant and Mr. Moyes sustained minor

o

The appellant was charged with second-degree murder
in violation of Utah Code Annotated,
amended.

§

76-5-203 (1953), as

He was tried without a jury before the Honorable

Calvin Gould, Judge of the Second Judicial District in and for
Weber County, State of Utah, on September 3, 1981.
At the trial Officer King testified that he saw the
motorcycle operated by Mr. Feeney traveling east on 31st South
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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seconds before a building obstructed his view and he heard the
accident.

Mr. Feeney was traveling within the speed limit,

with his lights on, and appeared to be observing all traffic
laws (T. 19).

Subsequent autopsy indicated that Mr. Feeney

had no drugs or alcohol in his system at the time of the
accident, and that he died from multiple contusions,
lacerations and fractures over most of his body (R. 29-33).
Vicky Bojanski was traveling south on Washington
Boulevard moments before the accident.

She stopped at the red

light on 30th South and saw the appellant's truck approaching
"quite fast" in her rear view mirror (T. 94).

She was afraid

the truck would hit her as it sped into the 30th South
intersection before the traffic semaphore turned green.

She

watched the truck as it swerved back into the lane in which
she was driving.

When the light turned green Vicky continued

down Washington Boulevard, keeping her eyes on the truck (T.
95).

The truck did not slow down as it approached the red

light on the 31st South intersection, and Vicky thought to
herself "he is going to run that light to9."

She then noticed

a "glance" of light and heard a crash before she pulled up
behind the scene of the accident (T. 96).
Kerry Moyes, the passenger riding with the
appellant, testified that despite at least four (T. 57, 73)
attempts to get the appellant to slow down and orive better,

-3-
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the appellant "just kept going."
cruised"

(Re

He "just hit the pedal and

21) through seven red lights (T.

60)e

The

appellant responded to the pleas to slow down by hitting the
pedal and cruising {R. 26, 28; T. 57).
Accident investigation showed that the appellant hit
Mr. Feeney with the right front of the pick-up truck, damaging
the light, grill, and fender of the truck (T. 14)o

The

motorcycle and Mr. Feeney were struck on their left sides (Ro
29-33).

Mr. Feeney's body was found 151 feet down Washington

Boulevard (T. 12).

The motorcycle flew· ·t:nrough the air 62

feet __ (T. 13) before gouging the road surface and tumbling to a
rest 179 feet from the point of impact.

The appellant's truck

slid sideways, rolled, and toppled to a rest upside down 246
feet from the point of collision (T. 12).

The appellant's

blood alcohol level was found to be .12% approximately one
hour after the wreck (T. 39).
Officer Kevin Youngberg testified that the appellant
was going 59 miles per hour after he hit the motorcycle and
went into a skid (T. 104).

Officer Youngberg based this

testimony on the curve of the tire scuffs left on the surface
of Washington Boulevard before the truck began to roll.
The appellant testified in his own behalf.

His

version of the incident is characterized by an attempt to
mitigate the severity of what occurred.

However, appellant

-4-
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did admit that immediately after the collision occurred he
realized the semaphore for the direction he had been traveling
was red (T. 200, 204-205).

He also acknowledged that he

realized if someone came through the intersection from the
opposite direction he would have seriously injured or killed
them ( T. 210) •
Appellant testified that his right leg was
artificial, that he drove with his left leg, and attempted to
account for the apparent speed of the truck as determined
after it rolled by stating that his artificial leg fell on the
accelerator after the initial collision
182, 190, 201).

~ith

Mr. Feeney (T.

He stated that he never drove more than 40

miles per hour (T. 197).

He further testified that he had a

problem with hearing "voices" which told him to do irrational
things and that he had been hearing such "voices" while
driving on Washington Boulevard just before the collision (T.
183-185' 199).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT ACTED WITH THE "DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE TO HUM.AN LIFE" NECESSARY TO
SUSTAIN THE SECOND-DEGREE MURDER
CONVICTION.

The appellant was charged with violating Utah Code
Annotated,

§

76-5-203 (1953), as amended:
-5-
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76-5-203. Murder in the second degree.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder
in the second degree if the actor:

*

*

*

(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing
a depraved indifference to human life, he
engaged in conduct which creates a grave
risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another;
(2) Murder in the second degree is a
felony of the first degree.
The appellant was intentionally speeding and running
red lights as he killed Mr. Feeney.

These substantive facts

show that the appellant created a "grave.risk of death" for
Mr. Feeney and are not in dispute on appeal.

The question is

whether the evidence supports the finding that the appellant's
actions evidenced a "depraved indifference to human life" as
he sped through the red lights on Washington Boulevard.
Utah statutes do not define "depraved indifference
to human life;" however, this Court has provided sufficient
precedent to pinpoint the meaning of the phrase.

In State v.

Day, Utah, 572 P.2d 703, 705 {1977) we note the following:
Ordinarily, non-technical words of
ordinary meaning should not be ·elaborated
upon in the instructions given by the
court. It is presumed that jurors have
ordinary intelligence and understand the
meaning of ordinary words like "depraved"
and "indifference."
[3] While the jury was deliberating, they
requested a dictionary • • • •
-6-
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*

*

*

It is difficult to believe that the court,
by an instruction, could have improved
upon the definitions contained in the
dictionary.
This Court felt that the factfinder was qualified to know the
ordinary meaning of "depraved indifference to human life" and
was willing to rely on the factfinder's determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence showing "depraved indifference."
Later, in State v. Nicholson, Utah, 585 P.2d 60, 62,
63 (1978), this Court added:
Defense counsel indulges in a lengthy
dissertation about the historical changes
in statutes, concerning what is ~malice,"
comparing manslaughter and murd~r
legislation that leads to some kind of
conclusion that 76-5-203 doesn't mean
"depraved indifference" but something
different and greater than "negligent" or
"reckless," which requires a higher degree
of proof.
He seems to be suggesting that
in this case defendant was simply
negligent, or careless, or reckless; and
that consequently there was insufficient
evidence to reflect "depraved ·
indifference."

*
*
*
discussion as

Defendant's
to the meaning
of the language of the statute is academic
and tends to obfuscate the normal
interpretation of familiar word~,~and
there appears to be nothing ambiguous or
uncertain in the language, particularly
that in "c".
Day and Nicholson clearly indicate that the meaning
of "depraved indifference" is not to be confused by legal
applications of extrinsic theories; the words connote their
-7-
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usual and ordinary meanings and that is all.

Nicholson cites

five cases from other jurisdictions wherein "depravity" was at
issue to provide -guidelines as to the words' ordinary
meaningse

One such case, Wagner v. State, 250 NoW.2d 331, 340

(Wis. 1977), contains an excellent discussion of "depravity":
The depravity of mind referred to in
second degree murder exists when the
conduct causing death demonstrates an
~tter lack of concern for the life and
safety of another and for which conduct
there is no justification or excuse • o o
•

o

•

*

*

*

,-·.- ··J.

A depraved mind is one having in [sic]
inherent deficiency of moral sense and
rectitude. Otherwise it-would not prompt
an act which in its nature is imminently
dangerous to the safety of another. The
element of the disregard for life likewise
calls for a state of mind which has no
regard for the moral or social duties of a
human being.
A depraved mind must be indifferent to the
life of others. Such negative attitude is
not found in the mind of a nor~al,
reasonable person. The desire to live and
the recognition others desire to live and
have a right to life is innate in the mind
of a normal person. Mere negligence alone
is not sufficient. A high degree of
negligence may be an element.- ·_. Such degree
of negligence is an element of ·homicide by
negligent use of a vehicle or weapon.
See also:

State v. Draves, Or. App., 524 P.2d 1225 (1974);

State v. Hokenson, 527 P.2d 487 (Ida. 1974).
For centuries the common law required a showing of
malice for second-degree murder.

As time went by, the legal

-8-
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meaning of malice developed to connote an "evil intent"
whereas the ordinary meaning remained "animosity" or "ill
will."

The distinction became difficult for jurors to

understand and confusion in instructions and verdicts
resulted.

This divergence in definition prompted the drafters

of the Model Penal Code to eliminate malice from the
legislative descriptions of homicides in the 19SO's.

The Utah

Legislature intentionally avoided the concept of malice in the
present Utah Criminal Code for the same reason.

Justice

Wilkins, concurring in the Nicholson opinion at 63, stated:
The main opinion cites cases and-discusses
principles of law which were pertinent to
our criminal code prior to 1973, at which
time the Utah Legislature enacted the
present statutes under which defendant was
convicted.
The term "malice" and "malice
aforethought" are not used in the present
homicide statutes. The term "malice" was
part of the prior law.
Likewise, the
prior statutes provided that "malice" was
"express" or "implied" while t~e new
statutes use entirely different language.
We must apply the new law, not engraft the
old terms into the new statute when the
Legislature has seen fit to change those
terms.
Justice Wilkins presented an excellent discussion of the
various standards in the Model Penal Code as it relates to
"depraved indifference" and concluded:
I do not believe that the Legislature
intended that "depraved indifference to
human life" under subsection ( c) should be

-9-
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measured by the same "awareness" of the
certainty that the risk would result in
death as the word "knowing" would entail o
Instead, the greatness of the risk, and
the lack of justification for the creation
of that risk are the tests.
Id. at 65.
Although in an earlier case, this Court stated:
For many years the definition of second
degree murder has been the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice
aforethought, and that of manslaughter was
the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice. In out opinion the new
criminal code has not changed- ""those
.
definitions.
,,,.~

·.

.

Farrow v. Smith, Utah, 541 P.2d 1107, 1109 _(1975)0 As Day and
Nicholson provide, it is now clear that malice is no longer a
necessary element of second-degree murder in Utah.

Even if it

were an element, the cases discussed below indicate that this
case was properly a second-degree murder case.
Because the Utah Criminal Code is relatively new and
the standard of "depraved indifference to human life" is
novel, there is little precedent for second-degree murder
convictions under similar statutes in other jurisdictions and
involving facts similar to this case.

Murder of the second

degree has, however, been found under similar facts with
statutes requiring malice, express or implied.

-10-
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In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 337 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1975),
the intoxicated defendant, speeding in an automobile, hit a
youngster on a bicycle and killed him.

On appeal, the court

found the evidence adequate to show:
wanton and reckless conduct which
manifests an extreme indifference to the
value of human life which transcends the
negligent killing and reaches the level of
malice which supports a verdict of murder
in the second degree.
Id. at 548.

The conviction of second-degree murder was

affirmed.
In Layne v. State, 531 S.W.2d 802 (Tenn. 1975), the
court held that a claimed "overwhelming

compulsion~

to ingest

drugs and alcohol would not justify the reckless use of a
motor vehicle.

The inebriated defendant negligently crossed

the center line of the highway and killed two people in a
head-on collision.
• • • we nevertheless hold that a driver
of an automobile while intoxicated and
driving recklessly upon the public
highway, will not be heard to say he had
no intention of doing an injury to the
person or property of another •. The intent
to commit a criminal act, • . • . is
evidenced by the act itself, so in the
case at bar intent is evidenced (1) by the
wilful drinking of intoxicating liquors,
(2) knowingly driving an automobile while
drunk at a dangerous and reckless rate of
speed, to wit 60 and 70 miles an hour, and
{3) with knowledge that his condition in
thus driving was perilous to every person
-11-
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on the highway including the defendant
himself. It would be a mockery of the law
for one thus guilty of violating the
criminal laws of the State, enacted for
the protection of human life, to say he
could not foresee the consequence of his
act.
Id. at 803, 804.

The conviction of second-degree murder was

af firmedo
In Palmer v. State, 401 So. 2d 266 (Alaa 1981), the
defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after killing
the victim in an automobile accidento

The court found the

defendant capable of second-degree murae·t ,although his blood
alcohol level was .26% two hours after the fatal accident.
Proof of consciousness of the act, consciousness of impeding
danger, and of consciousness of probable results, with
reckless indifference to the probable consequences was
apparento

The conviction of second-degree murder was

affirmed.
In Commandu v. State, 374 So. 2d 910 (Ala. 1978),
Mrs. Henderson had pulled off the road to fix a flat tire.
Her son was removing the spare from the ·trunk when the drunk
defendant, coming from behind, hit Mrs. Henderson's car and
knocked it 80 feet down the road.

The Henderson boy did not

survive the accident.
Mrs. Henderson was repelled away from her
automobile by the collision. She
sustained a broken leg and sent two of her
-12-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

children to seek help. Mrs. Henderson
testified that she saw the appellant get
out of his automobile and throw some
bottles out of his car.
She called to him
and after two or three minutes he came
over and asked if she was all right.
"I said, 'Yes, but you have killed my
young'un'.
He said 'No, I hadn't killed
nobody'.
So, I could smell the alcohol
around him and I told him.
I said,
'You're drunk, ain't you'? He said, 'No
lady, I'm not drunk, but I'm gonna be
drunk'.
And I told him next time he put a
beer to his mouth, I hoped he could see
what he had done there tonight."
The appellant then went and lay down near
the Henderson automobile.
Id. at 912.
The court held that it was a "settled principle of
law that where death ensues from an act done without lawful
purpose, dangerous to life, malice is implied."

Id. at 914.

The conviction of second-degree murder was affirmed.
In Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539 (Ky.
1978), the defendant appealed from a twenty-year sentence
based upon a conviction of second-degree murder.
defendant had been traveling down a

stree~

The

at 50 miles per

hour, ignored a red light and killed a woman lawfully entering
the intersection on a green light.

Two hours after the

accident the defendant's blood alcohol level was .18%.

The

applicable statute for second-degree murder was similar to
that of the statute considered in this case and read:

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A person is guilty of murder when:
(b)
Under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life, he wantonly
engaged in conduct which creates a grave
risk of death to another person and
thereby causes the death of another
person.
Id. at 541.

The court found the defendant's conduct met the

requirements of the statute:
The facts in this case demonstrate that
the accident was not the typical
automobile accident where a driver makes a
gross error of judgment and is tried for
manslaughter or reckless homicide.
Rather, Hamilton's conduct surpasses the
usual vehicle manslaughter case,and
demonstrates "wanton" conduct and extreme
indifference to human life.
The jury was
instructed on murder, second degree
manslaughter and reckless homicide.
It
found that Hamilton should· have known of
the plain and obvious likelihood that
death or great bodily injury could have
resulted from operating his truck, while
in a drunken condition, through an
intersection where a red light demanded
that he stop.
This is a "hurry-up" world of people on
the go, with heavy traffic by high-powered
vehicles on all types of roads and at all
times of the day or night.
Such a
situation coupled with a driver's inclination to take "one or more [drinks] for the
road," increases the vehicular ·aeath rate
on the highways of this Commonwealth. A
majority of the members of this court is
of the opinion that the legislature
enacted KRS 507.020{l)(b) to deter such
conduct.
The legislature is commended for
taking a giant step forward.
Its action
in enacting this statute will do much to
decrease vehicular highway deaths by
persons operating an automobile while
under the influence of intoxicants.
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Id. at 541.

The conviction for second-degree murder was

affirmed.
The fact findings of the trial court will not be
disturbed by this Court unless " • • • the evidence was so
inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting
fairly must have entertained reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime."

State v. Mills, Utah, 530-

P.2d 1272 (1975); State v. Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66 (1977);
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980).

Further, the

evidence relied upon by the trier of fact need not refute
contrary allegations by the defendant.
at 232.

State v. Lamm, supra,

As discussed above, and as will be further discussed

in Point III of this brief, the evidence adduced in this case
was sufficient to support Judge Gould's finding that
appellant's conduct constituted "depraved indifference to
human life" in convicting appellant of second-degree murder
(R. 18).

This conviction should not be reversed for

insufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of guilt.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT WAS AWARE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL
AND UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK OF DEATH AND
THEREFORE THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE
STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY.

At the time of the accident in this case, Utah Code
Annotated, § 76-5-207 (1953), as amended, read:
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76-5-207. Automobile homicide~ (1)
Criminal homicide constitutes automobile
homicide if the actor, while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, a
controlled substance, or any drug, to a
degree which renders the actor incapable
of safely driving a vehicle, causes the
death of another by operating a motor
vehicle in a negligent manner.
(2) The presumption established by Section
41-6-44(b) of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act,
relating to blood alcohol percentages,
shall be applicable to this section, and
any chemical test administered on a
defendant with his consent or after his
arrest under this section, whether with or
against his consent, shall be admissible
in accordance with the rules.of evidence.
(3) For purposes of the automobile
homicide section, a motor vehicle
constitutes any self-propelled vehicle and
includes, but is not limited to, any
automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train,
engine, watercraft, or aircraft.
(4) Automobile homicide is a felony of the
third degree.
The standard of negligence required for conviction
under this statute was criminal negligence as defined in Utah
Code Annotated,

§

76-2-103 (1953), as

Chavez, Utah, 605 P.2d 1226 (1979).

am~nded.

State v.

Section 76-2-103

provides:
A

person engages in conduct:

{4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result Of his conduct when he ought to
be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk
-16-
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must be of such a nature and degree that
the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care
that .an ordinary person would exercise in
all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.
Criminal negligence requires only that the of fender
ought to have been aware of the substantial and unjustifiable
risk associated with the conduct.

In this case it was shown

at trial that the appellant was actually aware of the grave
risk of death to another, as is evidenced by the testimony of
the appellant himself.
Brent, you realized that if somebody
did come through a green light geing
through one of those intersectioris, and
you hit them, they might he seriously
injured or killed, didn't you?
Q.

A.

Yes.

Q.

You knew what you were doing, didn't

you?
A. Well, yeah, I guess I knew what I was
doing.

Okay. were you concerned about the
fact that somebody might run through those
intersections on a green light, and you
would be there to meet them?
Q.

No, the thought never crossed· my mind.
I was watching for them.

A.

( T. 210) •

Moreover, if the appellant was not aware of it on
his own, his companion and passenger, Kerry Moyes, made it
-17-
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clear to the appellant that he was creating a risk of death
(T. 57, 73).

The following is from a police report by Moyes:

Did Bindrup stop at any of the lights
or did he just slow down and then proceed
through.
A. He stopped at some of them, I know he
didn't run all of them from the Golden
Spike. But he did run the last five or
six.
Q. What street did you enter Washington
Blvd. from?
A. I don't remember. It seems like we
went straight from Harrisville Rd. to
Washington Blvd.
Q. How fast were you traveling down
Washington Blvd.?
A. I never looked at his gauge.
Q.
Did you feel he was traveT"ir,ig too fast
or dangerously driving?
A. I don't feel he was driving
dangerously but he was at least ten overo
Q. Did you ever ask Bindrup to slow the
truck down?
A. I didn't ask him I told him to slow it
down.
Q.
Did you run any red lights at a high
rate of speed before the accident?
A. At least one.
Q.

(R. 27, State's Exhibit K) (emphasis added); and the following

from the preliminary hearing:
Yes. Okay. Now, did Brent slow down
at all for the last several re~ lights
that he ran including the one ·at 31st and
Washington where he hit the mo~orcycle?
Q.

No, sir. The last few he just went
straight through.

A.

What did you say to Brent when he
started driving like this?

Q.

A.

I told him to stop.
-18-
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Q.

Were you concerned about the
circumstances?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
What was Brent's reaction when you
told him to slow down :or knock it off?
A.

He just kept going.

Q.

Did he say anything?

A.

No.

Q.

Did he look at you or change his
facial expression at all?

A.

He looked at me and that, and kept
going.

Q.

Just kept going?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How many times did you tell him to
knock it off or slow down?
A.

About four times.

(R. 21, State's Exhibit L).
The appellant did not kill Charles Feeney as a
result of criminally negligent behavior; he intentionally sped
through the red light at the intersection of 31st South and
Washington Boulevard, causing the grave risk of death to
himself, his passenger, and Mr. Feeney.

His intoxicated

condition did not prevent him from being aware of the
circumstances whereby he killed a man.

There was no delayed

reaction, no torpid attempt to stop for the light, no clouded
perception of the situation, and no mistake as to the speed
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the appellant was traveling.

The appellant began speeding,

began running red lights in the wee hours of the morning1 he
grew bolder at each light as the chance for collision became
greater at each light.

He intentionally and repeatedly drove

through intersections he was prohibited from entering and by
so doing disregarded the grave risk of death he created
thereby.

Kerry Moyes testified that the appellant "drove real

good" (T. 20) until he started running red lights.

The

appellant decided to disregard the light at 31st South and
killed Mr. Feeney.

Thus, his

mere-criminal negligence.

conduct'~~idenced

much more than

Cf. State v. Hallett, Utah, 619

P.2d 335 (1980), bending over a stop sign constitutes criminal
negligence.

Appellant's argument that since his conduct

occurred at 2:00 a.m. rather than at some other time when
there might have been more traffic, his conduct shows only
negligence and not "depraved

indifferenc~"

is misplaced.

There was no evidence that the streets were "virtually
deserted" as alleged in appellant's brief, and even if there
were, it would not change the nature of ··appellant's conduct.
In addition, appellant's contention that prior cases involving
convictions of automobile homicide involved more egregious
fact situations than this case and thus that the evidence in
this case does not support a conviction of murder, is also
without merit.

Appellant cites State v. Chavez, Utah, 605

P.2d 1226 (1979) as a case in which the facts evidenced a
higher degree of depravity than those of the case at bar.
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Respondent submits that the facts of Chavez might
have supported a second-degree murder conviction; that issue
was simply not raised since the defendant there was not so
charged.

Thus, Chavez is not authority for the proposition

that conduct such as appellant's cannot support a conviction
under§ 76-5-203(c).
Finally, appellant alleges that the automobile
homicide statute is more specific than the second-degree
murder statute and thus that the former should control.

As

argued above, respondent contends that'- ·appellant's conduct
evidenced a state of mind at least higher than that of
criminal negligence.

Appellant was actually aware of the

danger he was creating to human life and acted in complete
disregard of that dangere

Thus, the automobile homicide

statute, which at the time of the conviction required proof of
criminal negligence, does not apply to the facts of this case.
Appellant's contention that it is the more specific of two
statutes, either of which might apply in this case, is
erroneous.

POINT III
APPELLANT'S CONDUCT EVIDENCED "DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE" AND NOT MERELY
RECKLESSNESS AS REQUIRED FOR A CONVICTION
OF MANSLAUGHTER.
Respondent recognizes that the Utah Legislature
eliminated the word "reckless" from § 76-5-203(c} in 1979.
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The causing of a death in a reckless manner is now proscribed
by§ 76-5-205(a), the manslaughter statute.
"recklessly" is found in

§

The definition of

76-2-103(3) as follows:

A person engages in conduct:
o
•
(3) Rec-klessly, or maliciously, with
respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when
he is aware of but consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will
occur. the risk must be of such a nature
and degree that its disregard constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would
exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
$

Appellant contends in Point

III

of his brief that if this

Court reverses his conviction of

second~degree

murder, he is

entitled to the benefit of the automobile homicide statute,
rather than the manslaughter statute, on the theory that where
the same conduct is proscribed by two different statutes
involving different penalties, the accused is entitled to the
benefit of the lesser penalty.
This argument does not apply in this case since
§

76-5-207 and

§

76-5-203 do not proscribe the same conduct.

A conviction of manslaughter requires proof of recklessness,

while an automobile homicide conviction requires proof of only
criminal negligence.

Each of these terms is defined by

statute, and although each involves a gross deviation from the
ordinary standard of care, the distinction between the two is
-22-
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that for criminal negligence the actor "ought" to be aware of
the risk while for recklessness the actor is aware but
consciously disregards the risk.

Appellant's contention thus

fails.
Respondent contends that although appellant's
conduct in this case could have supported a manslaughter
conviction, it went even beyond the degree of recklessness
required under

§

removed from

76-5-203(c} in 1979, it may be presumed that

§

76-5-205.

Since the term "reckless" was

,. -

. •J •

the Legislature intended that "depraved indifference to human
life" is a mental state greater than
in

§

76-2-103.

reckl~ssness

as defined

In this case, appellant did not simply

consciously disregard a known risk of death to another (i.e.,
recklessness), he continued running through stoplights at a
high rate of speed despite repeated warnings by his passenger.
Appellant acknowledged those warnings by_srniling at
and continuing his conduct (T. 57, 73; R. 21).

~r.

Moyes

As indicated

in the Commentary to the Model Penal Code, risk is a matter of
degree:
Recklessness • • • presupposes an
awareness of the creation of substantial
homicidal risk, a risk too great to be
deemed_ justifiable by any valid purpose
that the actor's conduct serves. Since
risk, however, is a matter of degree and
the motives for risk creation may be
infinite in variation, some formula is
needed to identify the case where
-23-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

recklessness should be assimilated too••
(intentional conduct). The conception
that the draft employs is that of extreme
indifference to the value of human life.
The significance of • • • (intentional
conduct) is that, cases of provocation
apart, it demonstrates precisely such
ind if fe·rence. • • •
Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft #9, 29-30 (May 8, 1959).
This is not a case where the appellant's state of
mind must be inferred from the circumstances surrounding his
conduct alone.

The direct evidence of Mr. Moyes and even the

testimony of appellant establish that his conduct was
intentional.

When viewed in this light, appellant's conduct

is not distinguishable from shooting a guh -into a c-rowd or
running one's vehicle into a parade, which appellant admits
are situations justifying a second-degree murder conviction.
The mere fortuity that this death occurred at 2:00 a.m. rather
than at a time when the streets were more congested with
traffic does not provide a basis for distinguishing
appellant's conduct from the examples given.

Just before the

accident occurred, appellant had passed the vehicle of Vicky
Bojansky as he ran through the rea light at,30th South and
\'lashing ton Boulevard ( T. 94-96).

Thus, appellant knew that

the streets were not totally deserted, as he admitted at trial
(T.

196).
People v. Marcy, Colo., 628 P.2d 69 (1981) provides

significant guidance in distinguishing "extreme indifference
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human life" from reckless manslaughter.

In Marcy, the

Colorado Supreme Court held that "extreme indifference to
human life" was not sufficiently distinguishable from the
second-degree murder statute to provide a rational basis for
punishing such murders under the first-degree murder
provisions.

The Court went on to discuss the meaning of

extreme indifference murder as follows:
Extreme indifference murder involves
conduct that creates a grave risk of death
to another. "Grave" is commonly
unders toad to mean serious or imminent, or
likely to produce great harm ..
danger.
See Webster's New International Dictionary
at 1094 (2d ed. 1958). Second degree
murder encompasses conduct that is
practically certain to cause the death of
another [citations omitted]. "Practical
certainty" has been used interchangeably
with the term "more than merely a probable
result" [citation omitted]. • • • it was
described as "such a high probability of
death that death was practically certain"
[citation omitted]. In the context of
criminal homicide, conduct that is
practically certain to cause the death of
another is the semantic equivalent of
conduct creating a grave risk of death to
another. Any difference here is so
imperceptible as to vitiate its meaningful
application in an aojudicativ~-' proceeoing.

or\

•

•

•

The statutory terminoloqy under scrutiny
is descriptive of the facts or
circumstances under which the death
causing conduct occurred.
It seems to
reflect a judgment that there is a certain
indifference that is qualitatively
distinct from the conscious disregard
required for reckless manslaughter • • •

-25-
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We do not view the term "under
circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life"
as without meaning. What it connotes is a
heightened awareness and disregard of a
fatal risk. People ex rel. Russel v.
District Court (521 P.2d 1254 (Colo.
1974)) ,· noted that "an extreme
indifference to human life is clearly a
more culpable standard of conduct "than
the reckless conduct involved in
manslaughter • • • Reckless manslaughter
requires a conscious disregard of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of
deaths
628 P.2d 69, 79 (emphasis added).
Applying this standard to this case, appellant's
conduct evidenced that "depraved indif fereRce to human life"
required to sustain a conviction of second-degree murder under
§ 76-5-203(c), and went beyond the conscious disregard of a

substantial risk of death as required under reckless
manslaughter, § 76-5-205(l)(a).
Even if this Court finds that the evidence in this
case does not justify the conviction of second-degree murder,
the evidence, as discussed above, without doubt supports a
conviction of manslaughter, under§ 76-5-?0S(l)(a).

In the

event of such a finding, respondent requests that this Court
exercise its statutory power to remand the case ordering entry
of a judgment of conviction of the included offense of
manslaughter.

§

P.2d 1224 (1980).

76-1-402(5) and cf. State v. Noren, Utah, 621
The trier of fact in this case necessarily
-26-
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had to find every fact necessary for conviction of
manslaughter in finding appellant guilty of the greater
offense of second-degree murder.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Automobile Homicide Statute was
specifically enacted to deter drunk driving in this state.
Since the mental state of a drunk person is so often difficult
or hard to establish, the statute at the time of the
conviction in this case required only proof of criminal
,-·.·

negligence.

•J.

Intoxication, a death caused by an automobile

accident, and currently simple· negligence will sustain a
violation of Section 76-5-207.

Because of the ease of

conviction under the statute, the Legislature classified its
violation a third-degree felony--the same as writing a bad
check (Utah Code Annotated, § 76-6-505 (1953), as amended).
However, where an inebriate's mental state can be
shown, and that state of mind evidences a depraved
indifference to human life, the defendant should be held
guilty of second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, despite
his drunkenness.
intentional

Otherwise, a few drinks before the

cond~ct

constituting the crime would mitigate the

severity of the criminal act.

This cannot be the intention of

the Utah Legislature.

-27-
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Appellant acted in.these circumstances with depraved
indifference to the value of human life and not merely in
conscious disregard of a known risk of death or in a situation
where he should have known of such a risk.

Thus, he was

properly convicted of second-degree murder rather than
reckless manslaughter or automobile homicide.
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to
affirm the conviction of second-degree murder and further
requests, if this Court reverses the murder conviction, that
the Court remand the case to the trial court directing that
court to enter a judgment" of conviction of-manslaughter.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of May, 1982.

ROBERT N.

Assistant

General
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STATE OF UTAH,
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-vBRENT BINDRUP,
Defendant-Appellant.
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RESPONDENT'S ADDITIONAL
AUTHORITY
Case No. 18134

COMES NOW the respondent, by and through Robert N.
Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, and respectfully submits
the following newly uncovered case pursuant to Rule 75{p){3),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
I.

People v. Watson, Cal., 637 P.2d 279 (1981) is

offered in support of the following propositions:
A.

A fact situation similar to the case at
bar does not preclude a finding of implied
malice to support a second-degree murder
conviction even if proof of malice is
required by statute.
ra. at 281, 285-286.

B.

The automobile homicide statute is not a
more specific statute which takes
precedence over the second-degree murder
statute since the elements of each
(particularly the mental states involved)
are not identical.
Id. at 282-284.
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C.

The determination of criminal negligence
to support a charge of automobile homicide
in Utah is an objective test, whereas the
test for determining "depraved indifference
to human life" to support a charge of
second-degree murder focuses on the
subjective awareness by the defendant of
the risk created by his conduct.
Id. at
283-284.

Respectfully submitted this 16th day of June, 1982.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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of the foregoing Additional Authorities, postage prepaid, to
Reed M. Richards and Bernard L. Allen, Attorneys for
Appellant, The Public Defender Association, 2568 Washington
Boulevard, Ogden, Utah, 84401, this 16th day of June, 1982.
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